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Treating Psychopaths Fairly
Monique Wonderly, Princeton University Center for Human Values
H€ubner and White (2016) question the ethical justification
of employing risky neurosurgical interventions to treat
imprisoned psychopaths. They argue that (1) such inter-
ventions would confer no medical benefit on the psycho-
path as there is no “subjective suffering” involved in
psychopathy and (2) psychopaths could not voluntarily
consent to such procedures because they could have no
“internal motivation” for doing so. The authors
insightfully show that certain aspects of the psychopath’s
personality structure are especially relevant to assessing
the ethics of risky treatment options. As I argue, however,
the authors’ conclusions are too strong. A deeper look at
the psychopathic profile casts doubt on both (1) and (2). In
some cases, psychopaths can be plausibly construed as
experiencing subjective suffering from their disorder and
as appropriately motivated to voluntarily consent to neu-
rosurgical treatment. After arguing for this view, I suggest
that the psychopaths’ consent to neurosurgical interven-
tion might nonetheless be problematic, as their emotional
incapacities could preclude their abilities to adequately
appreciate the relevant risks.
H€ubner and White claim that there is no subjective suf-
fering involved in psychopathy. Contra the authors, I think
it is quite possible that psychopaths do, in some sense, suf-
fer from their psychopathy. While psychopaths do not typ-
ically lament their antisocial behaviors, they do experience
adverse emotions on account of their disorder. For exam-
ple, psychopathy is associated with heightened levels of
frustration and anger (Hare 1993; Blair, Mitchell, and Blair
2005). Such experiences are presumably unpleasant and
plausibly construed as a kind of suffering. Importantly,
certain features of the psychopath’s disorder may impede
her ability to convey this suffering in self-reports. These
features include fleeting affects and difficulties processing
and employing emotional language (Blair, Mitchell, and
Blair 2005; Kiehl 2006; Lander, Lutz-Zois, Rye, and Good-
night 2012). While not infrequent, the psychopath’s bouts
of frustration and severe anger tend to be short-lived and
thus generally do not resonate with her for long. This
aspect of psychopathy—in addition to a lack of facility
with emotional language—might explain why psycho-
paths do not report their condition as painful despite fre-
quent instances of subjective suffering. Neurosurgical
treatment aimed at modifying the psychopath’s behavior
would likely also reduce the psychopath’s own unpleasant
experiences of frustration and anger, as these features are
likely related. Thus, treatment could subjectively benefit
the psychopath and not just her society.
H€ubner and White rightly suggest that psychopaths
“approve of” their socially unacceptable attitudes and
behaviors. Yet, on my view, H€ubner and White infer too
much from this. They conclude that because psychopaths
lack moral motivation to change their behaviors, they can-
not be appropriately motivated to opt for treatment in the
sense that voluntary consent requires. This reasoning
assumes that the only relevant features of the disorder are
its associated moral deficits, but importantly, psychopathy
also involves features that are inimical to psychopaths’
own (nonmoral) interests. In addition to the adverse emo-
tions noted above, psychopaths also have difficulties form-
ing long-term goals, and their more immediate aims are
often hindered by impaired capacities for emotional/social
learning, discursive incoherence, and poor behavioral con-
trols (Hare 1993; Blair, Mitchell, and Blair 2005; Watson
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2013). Hare (1993) includes “poor behavioral controls” and
“lack of realistic long-term goals” among the psychopath’s
defining traits. Similarly, the psychopath’s impaired ability
to learn from social/emotional cues makes it more likely
that she will repeat mistakes that thwart her own ends
(Blair, Mitchell, and Blair 2005). Finally, while psychopaths
can be quite charismatic, they are also subject to what Gary
Watson refers to as “discursive incoherence”—marked, in
part, by an inability to manage one’s self-presentation in
minimally coherent ways (2013, 287). Psychopaths often
contradict themselves in speech and shift roles in mid con-
versation, making it difficult to effectively communicate
with others (Watson 2013). This amalgam of features sug-
gests that the disorder impedes the psychopath’s own
interests. While they may express no interest in moral
improvement, psychopaths might still be moved by the
prospect of being better positioned to achieve their imme-
diate ends. Neurosurgical treatment aimed at modifying a
psychopath’s immoral behaviors would likely also attenu-
ate some features of the disorder that hinder her own
aims, and she might find it choice-worthy on that account.
Though not all psychopaths would reason in this way
(especially since they often display a lack of regard for
their own interests as well as those of others), some might.
Of course, psychopaths might attribute their personal
adversity not to their psychopathy, but rather to society’s
misunderstanding and “unjust” treatment of them. But
even if this is so, it would not preclude the psychopath
from being appropriately (internally) motivated to opt for
neurosurgical treatment. While the psychopath might
regard her disorder itself as a favorable condition, she
might reasonably opt for treatment because she recognizes
that given the “unfair” structure of her society, her psy-
chopathy hinders certain of her goals—for example,
acquiring wealth, achieving power, and so on. For psycho-
paths, in particular, having their immediate aims satisfied
may be more important than retaining the constellation of
traits and desires with which they “identify.” This is
because it is not clear that they are especially attached to
their identities in the sense that typical non-psychopathic
agents are (Watson 2013). In any case, one’s decision to
seek treatment might be influenced by one’s external cir-
cumstances and still not divorced from one’s internal
motives in a way that undermines voluntary consent.
Consider, for example, a hypothetical case in which a
deaf person who regards her deafness as a positive condi-
tion (and one with which she strongly identifies) chooses a
risky surgery to reverse it because she reasons that, given
her unfairly structured society, the ability to hear will con-
fer certain advantages that she values more than retaining
her deafness—for example, greater employment prospects
that might make it easier to provide for her family. The
person in this scenario seems suitably motivated to volun-
tarily consent to treatment despite viewing her deafness
itself as largely positive and as obstructive only in virtue of
her societal structure. Likewise, the psychopath (incarcer-
ated or otherwise) might at once both regard her condition
as inherently good and opt to have it treated for reasons
that are not reducible to the mere desire to avoid social
sanctions. The ability to function in one’s society in a way
that conduces to achieving one’s own aims is surely a legit-
imate consideration when deciding on treatment.
While I question the particular conclusions that
H€ubner and White draw from their analysis, I agree
with their broader point that owing to the psy-
chopath’s personality structure, her consent to neuro-
surgical treatment might be especially problematic. To
my mind, however, the problem concerns not the vol-
untariness of the psychopath’s consent, but rather, her
ability to adequately appreciate the relevant risks.
Treatments that involve manipulating neural struc-
tures and/or stimulating (or suppressing) neural
activity, if successful, would likely change not only
psychopathic behaviors, but also the attitudes and
emotions that underlie those behaviors (Hoeprich
2011). Sudden, enhanced emotional awareness can be
traumatic. For example, John Elder Robison, whose
Asperger’s syndrome was treated with transcranial
magnetic stimulation, reported an “emotional awak-
ening” following his treatment—but one that
“overwhelmed” him, resulted in painful realizations
about past events, and ultimately led to the demise of
his marriage (Robison 2016). The effects of sudden,
enhanced emotional capacities could prove particu-
larly devastating for psychopaths. Psychopaths might
not merely have trouble adjusting to the novelty of
certain emotions, but they might also come to look
upon their previous attitudes and behaviors in a very
negative light, resulting in severe emotional pain.
Given the psychopath’s emotional deficits, and the dis-
tinctively emotional nature of the relevant dangers,
there is reason to doubt that she could fully appreciate
these risks.
Despite my objections to H€ubner and White’s view, I
think that the authors effectively and insightfully raise
important concerns about employing risky neurosurgical
procedures to treat incarcerated psychopaths. In order to
treat psychopaths fairly, we must consider how the partic-
ular features of their disorder impact the feasibility of pro-
viding medical intervention that meets minimal bioethical
standards. Given the preceding discussion, we should, at
the very least, exercise extra caution when considering
neurosurgery for psychopaths.&
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An Expanded Understanding of
Individual Medical Beneﬁt?
Dale Murray, University of Wisconsin–Baraboo/Sauk County
There has been some enthusiasm for the possibility of
treating incarcerated psychopaths using deep brain stimu-
lation (DBS) techniques. However, H€ubner and White
(2016) make a compelling case that incarcerated psycho-
paths cannot meet the legal and moral requirements of vol-
untary informed consent to such procedures in principle.
Since psychopaths by definition don’t care if they are
doing anything wrong when they transgress moral or legal
boundaries, they do not have internal motivation to agree
to research or therapeutic DBS for their condition. This
would mean that if incarcerated psychopaths had any
motivation to consent to DBS procedures, it would be for
external reasons (perhaps for a reduced prison sentence)
that would likely constitute undue influence. Since incar-
cerated psychopaths are members of a vulnerable group
(prisoners), external motivations are not sufficient for vol-
untary informed consent to DBS. With this, H€ubner and
White make a sufficiently strong case to undermine the
idea that incarcerated psychopaths could meet the require-
ments for voluntary informed consent to DBS.
But H€ubner and White make a second claim that is not
as clearly substantiated. They argue that incarcerated psy-
chopaths also cannot receive any individual medical bene-
fit from DBS procedures, as they do not suffer from their
condition. That is, psychopaths do not perceive themselves
as having any problem at all—in fact, they seem quite con-
tent with their condition. Because incarcerated psycho-
paths are part of a vulnerable group that has been
exploited before in research and clinical procedures, the
threshold for individual medical benefit is high. Thus, for
all prisoners what qualifies as individual medical benefit
needs to be direct and subjective. The definition of individ-
ual medical benefit for incarcerated psychopaths (as for all
other inmates) thus requires that they detect in their sub-
jective experience suffering that treatment or research pro-
tocols have a reasonable chance of remedying. However,
since incarcerated psychopaths don’t in fact experience
such suffering, they would not receive individual medical
benefit and thus not qualify for therapeutic or research
DBS.
On the one hand, H€ubner and White worry that psy-
chopathy is too “medicalized”—that it isn’t something
from which one can really be cured because it isn’t really a
disease, but instead a configuration of socially unaccept-
able traits. (I realize they say that for the sake of argument
they accept psychopathy as an ailment.) However, H€ubner
and White also anticipate the objection that their focus is
too much on medical research and therapy, while pro-
posed DBS for psychopaths might be considered a “moral
enhancement” instead of a medical intervention. Curi-
ously, H€ubner and White retort that they would worry
about such “de-medicalization” of psychopathy. It’s
unclear how H€ubner and White can consistently hold both
of these stances. It would be useful to know how they
would (definitively) classify psychopathy—presumably it
can’t be a medical and nonmedical condition simulta-
neously, so which is it?
Also, it is unclear why removing the distress of the
imposition of social sanctions wouldn’t be enough to qual-
ify as an individual medical benefit. How do we distinguish
the distress of a psychopath who is incarcerated from her
subjective suffering? Even if this “distress” isn’t an example
of subjective suffering, it will likely be experienced as some
sort of impediment, perhaps to her autonomy. After all,
incarcerated psychopaths are experiencing something that
causes them to desire freedom over incarceration.
But beyond that, H€ubner and White could be correct
that incarcerated psychopaths can’t subjectively suffer
from their condition. This leaves us with an intriguing nor-
mative question. Should subjective individual medical
benefit necessarily be the sole criterion for medical benefit
for any prisoner? Why can’t other types of individual ben-
efit qualify as medical benefit, at least to the extent that a
condition can be treated? After all, when physicians strive
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